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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
John A. Chernak*
Whether Police Officer is Liable in Tort for
Alleged Wrongful Shooting is a Question for
the Jury--Police officers were called by a bar-
tender to stop a fight between two men who
had been drinking. When the officers arrived
the men were seated quietly drinking beer. Ac-
cording to the plaintiff's witnesses, the officers
proceeded to the table where the men were
seated and began to pummel one of the men
with their night sticks. Drawing back from the
victim, one of the officers shot the man to death.
Subsequently the plaintiff, as sole survivor of
the intestate, brought an action against the two
police officers and the City of Yonkers for
wrongful death of the deceased, alleging in
separate counts that the officers were negligent,
that they had committed an assault and battery
upon the deceased and that the city was guilty
of having negligently employed unreliable
police officers. At the close of plaintiff's proof
the trial judge granted a motion to dismiss the
action against the city and at the close of all
the evidence dismissed the first cause of action
against the police officers for negligence, sub-
mitting only the assault count to the jury. The
plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of the
negligence count against the police officers
after the jury had found for the defendants
on the issue of assault. In granting a new trial
to the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals of New
York stated that it was a question of fact for
the jury as to whether or not the officers were
engaged in making an arrest at the time of the
shooting and whether or not the force used in
making such an arrest was more than was re-
quired so as to constitute negligence on the
part of the arresting officers. Flamer v. City of
Yonkers, 127 N.E.2d 838 (N.Y. 1955).
Force Required. to Arrest Suspect Renders
Confession Obtained Soon Thereafter Inad-
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missible-The defendant was captured after a
short chase by police officers. Compelled to use
force in order to effect the arrest, the arresting
officer injured the defendant, causing him to
bleed. Approximately one hour later the de-
fendant confessed to a charge of housebreaking
and larceny. During the course of the trial the
defendant repudiated his confession which was
admitted over his objection. Upon appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
it was held, assuming that the arresting officers
had used no more force than reasonably neces-
sary to effect the arrest, that "when a con-
fession is elicited so soon after the use of
violence upon the prisoner, resulting in blood-
shed, the compelling inference is that the con-
fession is not the free act of the prisoner. It is
immaterial that other coercion did not occur
at the very moments he was questioned and
signed the statement. Violence at the hands of
the Police admittedly had occurred within about
an hour. A confession made in such circum-
stances, and thereafter repudiated by the
accused, should not be admitted in a criminal
trial in a Federal court." Payton v. United
States, 222 F.2d 794 (D.C.Cir. 1955).
Witness Not Entitled to Counsel in Hearing
Before State Fire Marshal-An investigation
was commenced by the Ohio Fire Marshal con-
cerning a certain fire. During the course of the
proceedings witnesses called by the Marshal
refused to testify on the ground that the
Marshal refused to permit them to be repre-
sented by counsel. The Marshal thereupon
sentenced the witnesses to a term in the county
jail. The witnesses then petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus, arguing that the Fire Marshal
is not authorized to exclude counsel, and, in
the alternative, that if the statute does au-
thorize exclusion of counsel, it is violative of
both the 14th Amendment and of Article I,
§10 of the Constitution of Ohio. relating to
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self-incrimination and the right to representation
by counsel.
The statute states, in applicable part: "In-
vestigation by or under the direction of the
fire marshal may be private. The marshal may
exclude from the place where such investiga-
tion is held all persons other than those re-
quired to be present,..." Omo REv. CODE,
§3737.13 (1954). In affirming a judgment
denying the relief sought, the Supreme Court
of Ohio held that the statute gives no intima-
tion that counsel for a witness is required to be
present and that the Marshal may properly
exclude counsel. Addressing itself to the
constitutional objections, the court said: "There
is no 'trial' or 'criminal case' pending; there is
no 'actxsed party'; this matter is not pending
in 'any court'; self-incrimination is not in-
volved, inasmuch as the Fire Marshal agrees
that the appellants can not be compelled to
testify against themselves; the privilege is not
personal; and these appellants have not even
been sworn, as this court held necessary in the
case of State v. Cox, 87 Ohio St. 313, 101 N.E.
135 (1915), before the privilege can be as-
serted." In re Groban, 128 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio
1955).
Examination of Exhibit Slide under Micro-
scope by Trial and Appellate Judges Held
Proper-In State v. Martin, 128 N.E.2d 7
(Ohio 1955) the defendant was convicted of
manslaughter in the second degree by reason of
his reckless operation of a motor vehicle. The
evidence introduced by the state at the trial
without a jury was largely circumstantial, one
portion thereof consisting of an exhibit slide on
which was mounted fibers taken from the de-
fendant's car together with fibers taken from
the jacket of the deceased. After the state's
expert had testified that he could find no dif-
ference between the two fibers in composition,
size or color the trial judge examined the
slide under the microscope. On appeal the
judges of the Court of Appeals also examined
the slide, assisted by the expert from the Toledo
crime laboratory. This, the defendant argued,
was error. The Supreme Court of Ohio held
that it was proper for the appellate court to
examine the exhibit and the fact that it was
necessary for an expert to demonstrate the use
of the microscope did "not affect the propriety
of such examination." Although an appellate
court is not required to determine the weight
of the evidence it may examine the record to
ascertain whether or not the proper rules as to
the weight of the evidence and the degree of
proof have been applied.
Radar Evidence Held to be Admissible With-
out Expert Testimony as to its General Nature
or Trustworthiness-A radar team working the
New Jersey Turnpike issued a summons and
complaint to the defendant charging him with
traveling 66 miles per hour in a 60-mile speed
zone. At the time of the trial the evidence
showed that the troopers had been operating
the radar equipment--consisting of transmitting
and receiving devices, a calibrated speedmeter
needle and a permanent graph indicating the
speed of cars passing within its range-for ap-
proximately a year; and that on the day in
question they had set up their equipment, al-
lowed it to warm-up, tested it by driving their
car within its range and comparing its reading
with that of the speedometer on the car and
had otherwise properly and carefully insured
that it would give accurate readings. The state
also produced an expert witness who testified
as to the general nature and trustworthiness of
radar devices in general and of the one used in
this case in particular. The trial court found the
defendant guilty of exceeding the speed limit,
expressly finding that the radar equipment "was
properly set up and tested for accuracy and was
functioning properly and was a correct recorder
of speed."
On appeal from his conviction the defendant
attacked the radar evidence primarily on the
ground that the testimony indicated that there
was possible tolerance of error, thereby render-
ing the radar evidence inaccurate and unreli-
able. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that the testimony showed that any inaccu-
racies resulting from the placing of the equip-
ment or other factors would produce lower
rather than higher readings. The Court then
proceeded -to examine prior decisions and nu-
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merous articles dealing with the use of evidence
from radar speedmeters. Analogizing the de-
velopment of radar to other scientific discover-
ies, such as fingerprinting, X-ray machines,
blood grouping tests and the like, the Court
said: "The writings on the subject assert that
when properly operated they accurately record
speed (within reasonable tolerances of perhaps
two to three miles per hour) and nothing to the
contrary has been brought to our attention;
under. the circumstances it would seem that
.evidence of radar speedmeter readings should
be received in evidence upon a showing that
the speedmeter was properly set up and tested
by the police officers without any need for inde-
pendent expert testimony by electrical engi-
neers as to its general nature and trustworthi-
ness." Thus, the Court, in effect, indicated
that the accuracy of a radar speedmeter device
is a proper subject for judicial notice. Once the
state has shown that device was properly tested
and operated, its readings will constitute ad-
missible evidence to be weighed with other
evidence introduced into the record. State v.
Dantonio, 115 A.2d 35 (N.J. 1955). For an
examination of the impact of this decision,
See, 3 TRAFFIc DIGEST & REV. 10 (No. 9,
Sept. 1955).
Polygraph "Lie-Detector" Held to be In-
sufficiently Reliable to Permit Acceptance of
Test Results in Judicial Proceedings-Appel-
lant, who had been previously convicted of
robbery, petitioned for special relief in the form
of a habeas corpus proceeding. One of the
points upon which the appellant relied was
that he had repeatedly requested a lie-detector
test to prove his innocence. In the process of
denying the writ, the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania wade the following observations con-
cerning lie-detector tests: "The request for a
lie-detector is quite unusual. Appellant urges us
to hold that the polygraph test has now reached
the stage of scientific reliability that it should
be so recognized in our law of evidence ....
Appellant does not suggest to what use the
results of the test would be put in this ptoceed-
ing in the event they were favorable to him.
He says merely that it would be some more
evidence of his innocence. How much more
evidence of his innocence it would be is highly
questionable. We know of no recognized au-
thority which has ventured to state that the
polygraph test is judicially acceptable. The
basic case of Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C.
46, 293 F. 1013, 34 A.L.R. 145, in 1923 held
that such tests were not yet developed to the
point of reliability, and thus an offer to intro-
duce the results of such test were properly
refused. Subsequent cases in other jurisdictions
have similarly so held. Our Supreme Court has
on two occasions recognized the use of the lie-
detector as an inducement by interrogators to
procure a statement or confession. Comn. r.
Hippie, 333 Pa. 33, 2 A.2d 353 ;Com. v. Jones,341
Pa.541, 19 A.2d 389. That does not mean, how-
ever, that the test results themselves will be
recognized and admitted into evidence. The
reliability and scientific infallibility of the
polygraph, lie-detector, or other psychological
deception test must be more definitely estab-
lished before our courts will accept their
results as credible." Commmtwealth -,. Dilwarlh,
115 A.2d 865 (Pa.Super. 1955).
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